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Abstract
Since 2014 when Szegedy et al. [6] showed that carefully
designed perturbations of the input can lead Deep Neural
Networks (DNNs) to wrongly classify its label, there has
been an ongoing research to make DNNs more robust to
such malicious perturbations. In this work, we consider
a poisoning attack called Clean Labeling poisoning attack
(CLPA) [4]. The goal of CLPA is to inject seemingly benign
instances which can drastically change decision boundary
of the DNN due to which subsequent queries at test time can
be mis-classified. We argue that a strong defense against
CLPA can be embedded into the model during the training
by imposing features of the network to follow a Large Mar-
gin Gaussian Mixture distribution in the penultimate layer.
By having such a prior knowledge, we can systematically
evaluate how unusual the example is, given the label it is
claiming to be. We demonstrate our builtin defense via ex-
periments on MNIST and CIFAR datasets. We train two
models on each dataset: one trained via softmax, another
via LGM [7]. We show that using LGM [7] can substan-
tially reduce the effectiveness of CLPA while having no ad-
ditional overhead of data sanitization. The code to repro-
duce our results is available online.
1. Introduction
With the ubiquity of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs),
the issues concerning their security are becoming more and
more relevant. There is thus an increasing interest in the re-
search community to create Neural Networks which achieve
state-of-the-art results, while also being secure, private, and
robust. It is well known that DNNs are vulnerable to adver-
sarial perturbations [6] and an adversary might corrupt the
input imperceptibly but maliciously which would change
the classification result.
One such class of adversarial attacks is clean-label poi-
soning attacks (CLPA). In CLPA, an attacker constructs a
poison training instances which looks like one class to hu-
∗denotes equal contribution.
Figure 1: Distribution of likelihood values for cleaned
(MNIST Test Set) and poisoned data: Poisoned and cleaned
instances have mostly low and high likelihood, respectively.
This suggests we can differentiate confidently b/w cleaned
and poisoned instances via likelihood thresholding.
man, but like another class to DNN. The aftermath of poi-
soning is that the attacker can then, during test time, can
query the DNN with the malignant class which could be
mis-classified as benign. Thus, effectively, a malignant in-
stance can surpass the security mechanism. We try to tackle
such an attack exploiting the intuition that specially con-
structed poisoning instances are far away from the class dis-
tribution in the feature space of the class they’re claiming to
be. That is why, we impose Gaussian Mixture distribution
on the features. Experimentally, we show that it is relatively
difficult to generate adversarial examples for our model. To
our knowledge, this is the first model which embeds the
CLPA defense into the network itself without requiring ad-
ditional overhead of data sanitization.
2. Background
In this section, we explain the background relevant to our
model. First, we formally define CLPA [4]. Secondly, we
review LGM [7] and explain how likelihood of the features
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can be computed.
2.1. Clean-Label Poisoning attacks
In [4] authors introduced the notion of Clean Labelling
Poisoning Attack (CLPA) which we describe below.
Let Alice be an adversary, Bob be a potential victim.
Suppose that Charlie trains a huge network F (x) on a
gigantic cloud dataset DC and uploads the weights online.
Further assume that Bob wishes to finetune the model
F (x) for some task for which the clean finetuning dataset
Df = (Xi, Yi)
nf
i=1 is available online. However, Alice
constructs a poisoned dataset Dp = (Xi, Yi)
np
i=1 and
uploads it amid the Df to construct total finetuning dataset
Dt = Df ∪Dp. Notice that Bob is unaware of the poisoned
instances, since he will download the available data online
(which also potentially includes Dp). Next, Bob will train
his model f ′(x) on Dt which can potentially alter the
otherwise reasonable decision boundary into vulnerable
one, allowing subsequent target (usually malignant) class
to be misclassified into base (usually benign) class (see
figure 7 in appendix A).
In [4], the authors show how easy it is to make a clean-
label targeted attack to the class of models trained by trans-
fer learning techniques just with a single crafted examples.
More specifically, to create the poisoned examples, authors
optimize the following objective:
p = arg min
x
‖f(x)− f(t)‖22 + β‖x− b‖22 (1)
Where t and b are target and base image respectively.
f(x) represents the activations of penultimate layer, and β
is a trade-off parameter. As such, the image of constructed
poison is similar to base instance, while its features resem-
ble that of target instance.
2.2. Gaussian Mixture Loss
In [7] authors introduced a new approach to make feature
distributions more structured by incorporating some prior
assumptions about features in the loss function. They as-
sume the features of penultimate layer to be realizations
from a mixture ofK Gaussians corresponding toK classes.
During training, this Gaussian structure is enforced by in-
corporating a loss term which measures the deviation from
distribution and penalizes proportionally. The model learns
the means of K Gaussians as parameters which is encour-
aged to have large inter-distribution distance (α). For sim-
plicity, we used only isotropic mixture of Gaussians in this
project i.e. the co-variance matrix is set to identity.
The modelling assumptions are as follows: Features x
of a particular class are assumed to have the density shown
(a) Softmax Loss (b) LGM Loss (λ = 1)
Figure 2: Feature Distribution of MNIST Training Set: Fea-
tures are far apart for LGM Loss than for Softmax Loss.
Different classes are color coded.
in Eq 2. The class conditional density i.e. distribution of
features give the label is then given by Eq 3. The posterior
probability of class given feature is thus obtained via Bayes
rule as shown in Eq 4. This enables us to get the likelihood
of an example belonging to a class given its features.
p(x) =
K∑
k=1
N (x;µk, Σk)p(k) (2)
p(xi|zi) = N (xi;µzi , Σzi) (3)
p(zi|xi) = N (xi;µzi , Σzi)p(zi)∑K
k=1N (x;µk, Σk)p(k)
(4)
Under the assumptions described above, the large-margin
Gaussian mixture loss is given in Eq 5. It consists of two
components: (1)Lcls (softmax loss) and (2)Llkd (deviation
from Gaussian distribution) and λ is a trade-off parameter.
LGM = Lcls + λLlkd (5)
For further details, we refer the reader to [7].
3. Proposed Method
As explained in section 2.1, the attacker generates a poi-
son instance (xp, yp) such that the features f(xp) of dif-
ferent classes in a softmax pre-trained model get close-
by. However, since there is no way to query the like-
lihood p(f(xp)|yp), we cannot systematically know how
“unusual” the example xp is for the class yp that the poi-
soned instance is claiming to be.
To this end, we use LGM loss [7] to get likelihood
p(f(xp)|yp) of an example belonging to the class yp it is
claiming to be. The intuition is that poisoned instances
(xp, yp) are far away from their claimed class in the fea-
ture space. Thus, poisoned examples will have low likeli-
hood using which we can remove such suspicious instances
before fine-tuning the model. The complete proposed pro-
cedure is highlighted in the threat model in algorithm 1.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Constructed Poisons on MNIST Test Set for Softmax and LGM. Each set of 4 pictures contains
(from left to right): b (base), t (target), pCE (poison for softmax), pLGM (poison for LGM). For each set, notice that PCE
is imperceptible to human, unlike PLGM which has noticeable artifacts. This suggests that for FLGM (x), constructing
imperceptible poisons is relatively more challenging.
Algorithm 1: Our Contributions (Bold) in Attack
Model
1. FLGM (x) is pre-trained on DC via LGM loss
2. Alice generates poisoned dataset Dp
3. Dp is mixed along Df to create Dt = Df ∪Dp
4. Bob downloads Dt and FLGM (x)
5. Bob constructs filtered clean dataset
Dw = (Xi, Yi)i=1∀i, . . . , nt s.t.
p(FLGM (Xi)|Yi) > T
6. Bob can now fine-tune his model f ′(x) on Dw
4. Experiments and Results
In this section, we describe our experimental details and
present the results of our proposed methodology. The code
to reproduce the following experiments is available online1.
4.1. Datasets and Simulation Strategy
We use two standard datasets: MNIST [2], and CIFAR10
[1]. While the original poisoning paper [5] used ImageNet
[3] dataset, we skipped it because of computational con-
straints.
Please note that in the following experiments, we treat train-
ing sets as DC , while test sets as Df . As such, the pro-
posed methodology corresponds to training base networks
(which can be thought of as pretrained networks F (x)) on
DC , while creating poisons Dp on test sets (since in real
life, attackers poison on the Df ).
1https://github.com/muneebaadil/
likelihoods-for-poison
4.2. Training Base Models
To check if training a model with LGM loss [7] serves
as a good prevention mechanism against clean labelling
poisoning attacks, we train two identical CNNs; one with
standard cross entropy loss (FCE(x)) and another with
LGM (FLGM (x)). The intuition of doing so is such that
if our hypothesis is correct, we should see a difficulty in
generating poisons for FLGM (x) as opposed to FCE(x).
These two models now can be thought of as pre-trained
models F (x) trained on cloud dataset DC . Due to brevity,
we do not describe the network architecture here; how-
ever, it is presented in Appendix C for the interested readers.
We train both networks until convergence; the feature
distribution for both loss functions is shown in figure 2.
Notice that features are far apart for different classes in
LGM loss unlike standard cross entropy loss. Thus, loosely
speaking, it should be relatively difficult than softmax to
change the features of base class to resemble target class
while maintaining similarity to base class in the image
space.
4.3. Generating Poisons
Once the base models FCE(x) and FLGM (x) are
trained, we implemented poisoning algorithm according to
[4] to construct poisons for both base models to evaluate if
and how much is there a difference in poisoning examples,
when FLGM (x) is employed.
As the threat model assumes that the adversary can
only inject 10% of the data into Df , we constructed 100
poisoning instances Dp to inject inside Df (which is, in our
case, test-sets of MNIST/CIFAR10)2. For each poisoning
instance, target image t and base image b was chosen
randomly. And similarly as in the original paper [4], we
2Although, 10% of our test-sets is 1000, we only constructed 100 be-
cause of computational constraints.
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(a) Softmax Loss (b) LGM Loss (λ = 0.1)
Figure 4: Feature Distribution of MNIST Test Set and Poisoned Examples: Clean and poisoned instances are color coded by
their ground truth class and base class respectively. Note that only 20 random poisons are shown for clarity.
set maxIters = 1000 to construct a poison instance.
Lastly, we cross-validated β parameter in the algorithm and
empirically found β = 8e−3 to be the best performing one.
Figure 3 compares visual examples of constructed poi-
sons for FLGM (x) and FCE(x) on MNIST.3. Notice that
for each set of base b and target t, pCE is much less notice-
able of an adversarial example than pLGM , thereby suggest-
ing FLGM to be more robust against poisoning. We argue
this is because FLGM (x) features are far apart for differ-
ent classes, which makes changing a feature representation
without significant changes to image challenging. Further-
more, figure 4 shows the constructed poisoned instances in
feature space.
4.4. Using Likelihood to Filter out Poisons
One direct benefit of using a structured feature represen-
tation such as Gaussian is that we can evaluate the posterior
likelihood of features given the label p(f(x)|y). Thus,
we can ask the model that under learned representation,
how likely this feature will be encountered in a class. This
property of LGM can be leveraged to prevent CLPA by
simply using the likelihood as an inherent trust score of
an (image,label) pair and we can discard any impostor
example where p(FLGM (x)|yclaimed) < T .
Figure 1 shows that poisoned and normal inputs are well
separated in the likelihood space and thus can be easily dis-
tinguished. This is further confirmed by the ROC plot in
Figure 5 plotted over different threshold levels.
3Due to limited space, we put CIFAR10 results on Appendix B
Figure 5: ROC Curve for different likelihood thresholds to
filter out poisons.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we showed that structured feature distri-
butions such as mixture of Gaussians substantially restrict
the effectiveness of CLPA by making it more challenging
to construct clean poisons. It also additionally provides the
ability to query feature likelihood which again helps in fil-
tering the potentially poisonous examples. We demonstrate
our techniques on two datasets i.e. MNIST and CIFAR-10.
The constructed poisons on both datasets under LGM loss
are visibly very perturbed and would fail to pass as clean
labels. Additionally, we also show that even if the poison is
created, network is successfully able to detect it by thresh-
olding the feature likelihood thus preventing the attack.
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Figure 6: Constructed Poisons on CIFAR Test Set for LGM. Each set of 3 pictures contains (from left to right): b (base), t
(target), pLGM (poison for LGM).
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A. CLPA Demonstration
Figure 7: Demonstration of CLPA: A crafted poison in-
stance changes the otherwise decent decision boundary,
which mis-classifies a target into base. Figure taken from
[4]
B. Constructed Poisons for CIFAR10
Figure 6 shows constructed poisons for CIFAR-10
dataset for FLGM (x); figure 8 displays the likelihood statis-
tics of clean and poisoned data.
C. Neural Network Architecture
C.1. MNIST
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Figure 8: Likelihood histogram for CIFAR10. Our CI-
FAR10 model wasn’t convergent and we couldn’t explore
it further because of time limit.
—————————————————————-
MNIST Architecture for LGM Output Shape Param #
================================================================
Conv2d-1 [-1, 32, 28, 28] 832
PReLU-2 [-1, 32, 28, 28] 1
Conv2d-3 [-1, 32, 28, 28] 25,632
PReLU-4 [-1, 32, 28, 28] 1
MaxPool2d-5 [-1, 32, 14, 14] 0
Conv2d-6 [-1, 64, 14, 14] 51,264
PReLU-7 [-1, 64, 14, 14] 1
Conv2d-8 [-1, 64, 14, 14] 102,464
PReLU-9 [-1, 64, 14, 14] 1
MaxPool2d-10 [-1, 64, 7, 7] 0
Conv2d-11 [-1, 128, 7, 7] 204,928
PReLU-12 [-1, 128, 7, 7] 1
Conv2d-13 [-1, 128, 7, 7] 409,728
PReLU-14 [-1, 128, 7, 7] 1
MaxPool2d-15 [-1, 128, 3, 3] 0
Flatten-16 [-1, 1152] 0
PReLU-17 [-1, 1152] 1
Linear-18 [-1, 2] 2,306
Linear-19 [-1, 10] 30
LGM [-1, 10] 0
SoftMax [-1, 10] 0
================================================================
C.2. CIFAR10
We used VGG19 Architecture for training CIFAR10.
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